Monetary policy analyses usually assume an atomistic private sector, thereby ignoring potential interactions between policy and wage-setting decisions. Yet, non-atomistic wage setters are a key feature of several industrialized economies. We study the economic consequence of non-atomistic agents and show that this qualifies previous results on the effects and desirability of a conservative central banker. In particular, the central bank aversion to inflation may have a permanent effect on structural employment, while no such effect emerges with atomistic agents.
Introduction
Spawned by the seminal contributions of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) , strategic monetary policy models have been used extensively to study the macroeconomic effects of the central bank aversion to inflation ('conservatism') and derive implications for policy delegation to independent central banks. While most studies in this literature adopt the reduced form approach of the original contributions, more recent analyses, e.g. Ireland (1997) We present a monetary policy game where several features of previous widelyused models are related to agents' preferences, technology and market structure.
Workers have monopoly power, due to imperfect labor substitutability, and are organized into coalitions, called unions, which set nominal wages on behalf of their members. The model parametrizes the number of unions, so that atomistic agents are embedded as a special case. Our aim is positive: we focus on time-consistent monetary policy, assuming a central bank with a given degree of conservatism, to analyze how the latter affects equilibrium outcomes.
Our results challenge a basic tenet of the reduced-form strategic monetary policy literature, namely that equilibrium real variables are invariant to conservatism.
We show that if wage setters are non-atomistic, more conservatism may either increase or decrease equilibrium unemployment, depending on certain structural features of the economy. Intuitively, a large union understands that an increase in its own nominal wages, taking as given the nominal wages of the other unions, leads to an increase in inflation and hence to a reduction in the other unions' real wages. This reduction makes the other unions' labor cheaper (triggering labor substitution) and changes the economy's overall production. Both effects influence the labor demand faced by the union and, therefore, its employment choices.
Crucially, conservatism determines the magnitude of both effects (as perceived by an individual union) since it affects the inflation effect of a given nominal wage rise. The conventional result that equilibrium employment is unrelated to conservatism is obtained as a limiting case when wage setters are atomistic. This paper is closely related to the analysis of Soskice and Iversen (2000) , who study the employment effects of conservatism with large wage setters. The main novelty is that, in addition to the employment-increasing effect of conservatism discussed there, the model features a new channel through which conservatism may reduce employment. By nesting both channels within its framework, our model identifies a condition determining the sign of the impact of conservatism on employment. Some empirical evidence concerning such a condition leads us to argue, in Section 4.2, that an increase in conservatism reduces employment for most plausible parameters values.
The paper is organized as follows. The next Section describes our model economy. Equilibrium outcomes under discretionary monetary policy are derived in Section 3. The employment effects of conservatism are analyzed in Section 4.
The key hypotheses and some extensions of the model are discussed in Section 5. This is followed by concluding remarks.
The Model
We consider an economy in which a single consumption good can be produced using complementary, imperfectly substitutable, labor inputs. The economy features a profit-maximizing competitive representative firm and a continuum of symmetric workers (indexed by i and arranged in the unit interval) who supply labor, receive dividends from the firm, and consume. Workers are organized in n ≥ 1 unions, indexed by j, each of which has a set of members of measure n −1 on whose behalf it sets nominal wages. For reasons of tractability the argument is presented by means of a one-period model.
The Firm
The representative firm is price taker in both the output and the input markets. The firm produces output (Y ) using differentiated labor inputs, with the
where L i is the labor input supplied by worker i, σ is the substitution elasticity between labor varieties and α is the output labor elasticity. The representative
, taking wages as given. Cost minimization yields the firm's demand of labor type i
1−σ is an index for the 'aggregate' real wage.
Workers and Unions
Workers earn wage income and dividends and derive utility from consumption and leisure. Worker i's utility is
where γ is a preference parameter and C i is consumption. The representative union maximizes the utility of its members (of mass 1/n)
When the number of unions goes to infinity each union coincides with a worker (the atomistic case). It is hypothesized that unions take dividends (D i ) as given when setting wages. 1 The representative worker's budget constraint thus is
The real wage of worker i is defined as
, where π is the inflation rate, ω i is the percent increase in the nominal wage of worker i and the previous period real wage is normalized to one. It is assumed throughout the paper that the strategic choice variable of union j is the nominal wage growth of its members, ω j (i.e. ω i = ω j ; all i ∈ j). Aggregate nominal wage growth (ω) is
which implies that in a symmetric equilibrium union j perceives that its nominal wage growth increases aggregate nominal wage growth by a factor of 1/n, in direct proportion to its size. 1 The effects of central bank conservatism analyzed in Section 4 are not qualitatively affected by this assumption (see Section 7 of Lippi, 2000).
Monetary Policy: A Targeting Rule
Monetary policy amounts to the choice of inflation (a numeraire), as in most models in the Barro-Gordon tradition. We follow Svensson and Woodford (1999) and assume monetary policy is aimed at maximizing the targeting rule:
If I = 0, (2.7) describes the objectives of a benevolent planner who cares about the agents' welfare. If I > 0, then the central bank is inflation averse or, using Rogoff (1985) terminology, conservative. We use the parameter I to study the effects of different degrees of conservatism of monetary policy on equilibrium outcomes.
The central bank does not take D i as given, it thus faces the budget constraint
(2.8) 
Equilibrium

Time-Consistent Monetary Policy
The central bank problem yields the reaction function (Appendix A)
where Key to the non-atomistic case is that a large union understands that its nominal wage growth raises inflation, according to (3.1). The impact effect of ω j on inflation when the nominal wages of other unions (ω −j ) are taken as given, which we label s, is
where the last equality holds at a symmetric equilibrium. This effect depends on the size of the union and central bank conservatism. If the union is atomistic (n → ∞) the effect is zero; it is positive and decreasing in central bank conservatism if the union is not-atomistic.
Wage Setting
The typical union j maximizes (2.4) with respect to ω j subject to (2. 
where η is the real wage elasticity of labor demand. This condition describes the marginal costs and benefits associated to the wage setting choice of a union. The first term (α (1 − η)), which stems from the consumption argument of the utility function (2.3), has a negative sign, indicating that a higher wage decreases utility since it reduces consumption. The second term, stemming from the leisure argument of the utility function, is positive and indicates that a higher wage increases utility since it raises leisure. Equation (3.3) shows how the union trades off these marginal costs and benefits according to its consumption-leisure preferences (γ).
Equilibrium Outcomes under Discretionary Policy
Since unions are identical, we focus on a symmetric equilibrium (where L j = L for all j = 1, ..., n). Equilibrium employment is thus obtained from (3.3) as
Employment is increasing in the real wage elasticity of labor demand, η. Note that if the elasticity is finite (η < ∞) workers have market power, due to the imperfect substitutability of labor inputs. Comparing (3.4) with the efficient employment log L = α γ reveals that the monopolistic nature of the labor market leads to a suboptimal employment level, as in Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) .
Equations (A.1) and (3.4) yield the equilibrium rate of inflation
(3.5) Equation (3.5) shows that if employment is below the efficient level, the central bank's incentive to reduce real wages leads to inflation.
Real Effects of Conservatism
A novel feature of the model is that conservatism affects the real wage elasticity
of labor demand. To analyze this effect, let us consider the labor demand faced by the union, (2.2). It is assumed that each union understands that the output term appearing in that equation is determined by the optimizing behavior of firms, i.e.
Under these assumptions, the real wage elasticity is (Appendix C):
Each union thus perceives that its wage influences labor demand through two channels, represented by the two terms on the right hand side of equation (4.2).
The former, which we refer to as 'substitution effect', is due to the fact that a higher W j increases the wages of union j relative to the wages of the other unions, inducing firms to substitute away from union j 0 s labor varieties. This effect describes movements along an isoquant, at a given output level. The second channel, labelled 'output effect', is due to the fact that an increase in W j increases W , lowers output and hence decreases labor demand. This corresponds to a movement of the isoquant and it is perceived by the union under the assumption that it knows (4.1). This effect is not internalized if unions take aggregate production as given.
The partial derivative of (4.3) with respect to I yields:
This and the partial derivative of (3.4) with respect to η yield:
, is negative for σ(1 − α) > 1 (i.e. the 'substitution' effect of an increase in W j dominates the 'output' effect); it is positive when σ(1 − α) < 1.
(ii) If 1 < n < ∞, the absolute value of
is decreasing in n.
(iii) If either n = 1 or n → ∞, the impact is nil.
Proof. If 1 < n < ∞, the sign of (4.4) is negative for σ(1 − α) > 1, positive otherwise; moreover the partial derivative of (4.4) with respect to n is negative. This proves (i) and (ii). When one of the conditions specified under (iii) holds, the derivative (4.4) is equal to zero. This proves (iii).
Proposition 1 summarizes our main result: conservatism influences the wage setting behavior of non-atomistic unions thereby affecting employment (Part i).
The sign of this employment effect depends on the specific values assumed by two technological parameters: labor substitution elasticity (σ) and the output labor elasticity (α).
To understand this result it is useful to analyze the impact effect of the real wages of union j on the aggregate real wage (Appendix C) is
The impact is given by a direct effect, 1/n, proportional to the union size, and by an indirect effect,
. The latter occurs because the increase in inflation, caused by j's higher wages, reduces the other unions' real wages by raising inflation. Note that this impact is increasing in central bank conservatism: the larger is I, the smaller is the inflation increase (s). 3 Therefore the perceived impact effect is larger since the other unions' real wages are reduced by a smaller amount. Key to the employment effect of monetary policy is that both the output and the substitution effect depend on conservatism. A greater I has two opposed effects: first, it increases the impact of W j on the aggregate real wage (4.5); this raises labor demand elasticity (η) because it increases the size of the output effect.
Second, it decreases the impact of W j on 
Employment, inflation and the unions' monopoly power
The model provides a natural basis to analyze how inflation and employment are affected by different degrees of unions' monopoly power. The latter, as measured by the real wage elasticity of labor demand (η), depends on the number of unions (n) and on labor substitutability (σ). The partial derivative of (4.3) with respect The mechanism which determines the final impact of n on η is analogous to the effect of I on η described in Proposition 1. A larger n weakens the output effect and exacerbates the substitution effect. As before, the final effect depends on whether labor substitutability (σ) is sufficiently large. When this is the case (σ(1− α) > 1), an increase in the degree of wage setting decentralization increases employment and, by (3.5), decreases inflation.
What is the sign of the employment effect of conservatism?
The results in proposition 1 and 2 naturally prompt a question about the sign of the employment effect of conservatism. This is also of interest as the predictions of previous papers point in different directions. For instance, while the model of Soskice and Iversen (2000) suggests that more conservatism raises employment the opposite is predicted by Cukierman and Lippi (1999) . The framework of this paper allows a straightforward explanation of such differing predictions and identifies a condition determining which one prevails.
The employment effect described in Soskice and Iversen hinges on an 'output effect' analogous to that described in Section 4. But no 'substitution' effect appears in their model since the labor of different unions is not substitutable in production. Therefore, the employment effect of conservatism is unambiguously positive in their model. A different setup is used by Cukierman and Lippi.
While allowing for labor substitution, they assume that unions take the aggregate production level as given, thereby preventing the output effect from operating. According to Proposition 1, the employment effect of conservatism is negative if σ(1 − α) > 1. For α ∈ (0.55, 0.65) a sufficient condition for the inequality to be satisfied is σ > 2.9. Given the range of variation for σ suggested by the previous estimates, a negative (employment reducing) effect of conservatism seems to be a plausible case for most parameter values. This is due to the fact that, even under the assumption that unions internalize the effect of their wages on aggregate production, the labor substitution elasticity is likely to be large enough for substitution considerations to dominate the unions' problem. Thus, while we cannot rule out that in some countries (or some industries) the labor substitution elasticity is sufficiently low to give rise to a positive effect of conservatism, most of the magnitudes indicated by the microeconomic evidence imply a negative employment effect of higher conservatism. Note that in this case the model predicts, according to Proposition 2, that an increase in the decentralization of wage setting raises employment and lowers inflation.
Robustness and Extensions
How specific are the results discussed above to our particular model? we argue that real effects of conservatism are likely to arise in a wide class of models featuring alternative specifications of utility functions and policy rules. The findings of this paper suggest that ignoring the role of non-atomistic wage setters may yield imprecise predictions on the real effects of conservatism.
Thus, normative analyses of conservatism which overlook such real effects may be biased. Since our model neglects important aspects in the choice of optimal conservatism, such as the welfare costs of inflation, this implication is only a warning. A proper normative assessment of optimal conservatism should integrate non-atomistic agents within welfare-based models in which the inflation costs are explicitly modelled, e.g. Ireland (1997) , Neiss (1999) and Woodford (1999). We leave this task for future work.
A. Appendix: The central bank problem
The real wage definition and (2.6) are used to write the labor demand equation (2.2) and the budget constraint (2.8) in terms of nominal wages (ω j , ω) and inflation (π). This yields: log C i = H 1 − 
B. Appendix: A typical union first order condition
The typical union j maximizes (2.4) with respect to ω j subject to (2.5), (3.1) and taking ω −j and D i as given. The first order condition with respect to ω j (i.e. ω i for i ∈ j) yields (since nominal wages of union j members are identical we can integrate across them)
where we used dπ dω j¯ω −j ≡ s(I, n) (note that symmetry is not imposed in the computation of the union's first order conditions), 
C. Appendix: Derivation of the labor demand elasticity
Using equation (2.2) and (4.1), straightforward algebra reveals that at a symmetric
Let us calculate dW dW j¯ω
Since the wage is the same for the workers of union j (label this W j ) and across the workers of 'other unions' (i.e. all W i for which i ∈ −j, label this W −j ), we can integrate across each of these groups obtaining dW dW j¯ω 
